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Integrated Waste Treatment Unit 
GFSI Risk Management Plan 
1. PROJECT SCOPE SUMMARY 
This GFSI Risk Management Plan (RMP) describes the strategy for assessing and managing 
project risks for the Integrated Waste Treatment Unit (IWTU) that are specifically within the control and 
purview of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), and identifies the risks that formed the basis for the 
DOE contingency  included in the performance baseline. DOE-held contingency is required to cover cost 
and schedule impacts of DOE activities.  
Prior to approval of the performance baseline (Critical Decision-2) project cost contingency was 
evaluated during a joint meeting of the Contractor Management Team and the Integrated Project Team for 
both contractor and DOE risks to schedule and cost. At that time, the contractor cost and schedule risk 
value was $41.3M and the DOE cost and schedule risk contingency value is $39.0M. The contractor cost 
and schedule risk value of $41.3M was retained in the performance baseline as the contractor’s 
management reserve for risk contingency. The DOE cost and schedule risk value of $39.0M has been 
retained in the performance baseline as the DOE Contingency. The performance baseline for the project 
was approved in December 2006 (Garman 2006). The project will continue to manage to the performance 
baseline and change control thresholds identified in PLN-1963, “Idaho Cleanup Project Sodium-Bearing 
Waste Treatment Project Execution Plan” (PEP).  
The Federal Project Director – SBW is the ultimate owner of all DOE Risk. Other project risks 
related to operations and transportation are not included in this plan, but will be addressed during the 
operational phase of project implementation. The objective of the RMP is to provide a systematic process 
for managing the sodium-bearing waste (SBW) IWTU Project government-furnished services and items 
(GFSI) risks. This RMP will: 
• Serve as a basis for identifying strategies to eliminate or reduce impact of GFSI on cost and 
schedule goals 
• Assist in making decisions on budget and funding priorities on DOE contingencies for the project 
• Complement the contractor’s Risk Management Plan to ensure all risks and contingencies have 
been properly captured 
• Provide risk information for milestone decisions. 
The RMP identifies GFSI-related risks and defines strategies for mitigating those risks. In addition, 
contingency is analyzed and tabulated to compare current cost and schedule risks against the Project Data 
Sheet. Evaluated risks are listed on the Risk List in Appendix A. Appendix B contains the detailed risk 
assessment forms for each risk, and Appendix C contains the Monte Carlo reports that support the 
contingency analysis for the project. Appendix D is the project Risk Register and Appendix E are the risk 
categories. This revision reflects the project risks for Critical Decision-3.. 
This RMP will be updated prior to each critical decision, biannually, or more often if new risks are 
identified and are of magnitudes that require action by the Integrated Project Team (IPT). CD-2 approval 
is a commitment by DOE to the projects performance baseline. However, project risks may ultimately 
preclude success of the baseline, requiring implementation of a performance alternative. The IPT will 
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regularly evaluate project risks, and if it becomes apparent that the performance baseline cannot be 
achieved, then management will be notified and alternative solutions will be identified. 
The project has identified two high-risk issues and has developed a strategy to mitigate the risks in 
accordance with Action Memorandum, Request for Approval of the Sodium Bearing Waste Treatment 
Project Path Forward to Mitigate Project Risk Consistent with existing CD-1 Authorization (DOE 2006).  
The first issue involves uncertainty regarding disposal of the treated SBW at the Waste Isolation 
Pilot Plant (WIPP). DOE is responsible for providing a viable disposal pathway as Government Furnished 
Services/Items. A DOE waste determination for SBW is needed to allow SBW treated product disposal at 
WIPP. However, the SBW may not meet the WIPP waste acceptance criteria due to the presence of a 
small volume (approximately 7%) of reprocessing waste commingled with the SBW. Absent a transuranic 
(TRU) waste determination, SBW would not be allowed to be disposed of in WIPP. Although SBW has 
not been considered high-level waste by DOE for at least 10 years, recent legal actions, associated with 
DOE Order 435.1 waste classifications, have impeded DOE’s ability to formally determine that SBW is 
remote-handled, transuranic waste and make SBW eligible for disposal at WIPP. To address the risk, the 
treatment facility is being designed and constructed so it could be converted to treat the waste for 
alternate waste disposal at Yucca Mountain if needed. Additional pilot plant testing was conducted to 
evaluate waste form performance relative to the Yucca Mountain waste acceptance criteria. 
Although the treatment facility is being designed and constructed so it could be converted to treat 
the waste for alternate waste disposal at Yucca Mountain, if needed, and the pilot plant testing has been 
completed; the cost and schedule impacts of this risk represent a potentially fatal impact to meeting the 
performance baseline because it exceeds available contingency and entirely changes the complexion of 
the IWTU Project. Therefore, risk IWTU-DOE-002 “SBW is determined to be HLW” has been removed 
from the Monte Carlo Analysis. The project is baselined on WIPP waste acceptance.  
Although removed from the Monte Carlo Analysis, the Project will continue to track and monitor 
this risk. Evaluation of the worst case, should this risk be realized, is $100M capital cost plus 12 months 
schedule delay. Several mitigation actions for the waste determination risk have been undertaken by the 
project, including supporting DOE Headquarters in establishing a coordinated schedule for TRU waste 
determination criteria, individual TRU waste determinations, and a Class 3 permit modification submittal. 
In addition to these programmatic actions, the project is incorporating hardware modifications to the 
IWTU that would enable cost-effective implementation of the mineralization flowsheet that would result 
in a robust, treated-product waste form. These mitigation actions and an ongoing participation in the TRU 
waste determination process will enable the project to stay abreast of the waste determination status and 
effectively identify to DOE management if this risk becomes fatal to the performance baseline. 
The second issue regards a potential future mission for the facility. Approximately 4,400 cubic 
meters of calcine high-level waste (HLW) is planned for direct packaging and disposal at Yucca 
Mountain by 2035. However, calcine may need further processing to meet the Yucca Mountain waste 
acceptance criteria. To address this risk, the treatment facility is being  designed and constructed so it 
could be converted for calcine treatment if needed. Increased process cell vault shielding and seismic 
protection have been incorporated into the design to address this risk. 
2. RISK IDENTIFICATION APPROACH 
A risk is defined as an external circumstance or event that must not occur for the project to be 
successful. If such an event is likely to happen, then it would be a risk. Identifying something as a risk 
increases its visibility, and allows proactive risk management techniques to be put into place. Project risks 
  3
include any condition that could cause the project to negatively deviate from its required safety 
performance, specified quality levels, baseline cost, scope, or schedule.  
The Risk Register (Appendix D) is a forward-looking compilation of all risks documented during 
the risk identification, or brainstorming phase, of risk planning. The Risk Register is an Excel database 
that is maintained by the contractor for the entire SBW Project and is used for gathering all potential 
emerging risks as they arise. As risks are identified, they are added to the Risk Register. The following 
steps are used to complete the Risk Register: 
1. Record risk scenario 
2. Identify risk(s) to the project based on the scenario (example – critical path slippage) 
3. Assign risk category (see Appendix E) 
4. Assign risk sub-category (see Appendix E) 
5. Record any assumptions (circumstances or events the project team believes will occur based on the 
scenario) 
6. Record any uncertainties (unknowns related to assumptions and/or the scenario that may cause the 
risk to be realized). 
Lessons learned and team experience provide a sound basis for risk identification. The IPT, 
consisting of DOE Idaho Operations Office (DOE-ID) and contractor staff, was assembled to identify and 
evaluate GFSI and associated risks. The IPT is defined in the Project Execution Plan (PLN-1963). The 
team used a structured approach to identify and analyze those GFSI processes and products that are 
critical to meeting project objectives. Through multiple meetings, the IPT determined the risk probability, 
the risk impact, and the strategy to address the risk. The risk information is recorded in a standard Risk 
Assessment Form. Risk information will be included in all project reviews, and as new risks are identified 
they will be documented. The SBW Federal Project Director will conduct additional reviews as necessary 
to evaluate and mitigate future risks that could adversely affect the project. 
Risks may be identified by the IPT, or by any individual associated with the project, including 
DOE and contractors. Individuals involved in the detailed and day-to-day technical, cost, and scheduling 
aspects are most aware of the potential problems (risks) to be managed. The IPT has compared the GFSI 
identified risks with the contractor’s risk management plan, PLN-1973, “Integrated Waste Treatment Unit 
Risk Management Plan,” to ensure that risks are clearly defined, distinct, and not redundant or 
overlapping. As a result, two distinct lists of risks have been identified, evaluated, and documented; one 
for GFSI, which is the subject of this document, and one for contractor risk, which is documented in the 
contractor’s RMP. 
3. RISK ASSESSMENT 
Once risks and opportunities have been identified, the IPT then categorize the identified risks by 
probability and severity (consequences) of impact as outlined below. 
Risk Event Probability 
• Very Unlikely: The risk event is very unlikely to occur in the life of the project. If we ran this 
project a hundred times, it would not be expected to occur once. 
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• Unlikely: The risk event might occur once if we ran this project 10 times, but is unlikely to occur 
during this project. 
• Possible: The risk event could occur once during the project.  
• Likely: The risk event is likely to occur at least once during the project. More often than not, on a 
similar project, it will occur. 
• Very Likely: The risk event is very likely to occur at least once and probably will occur multiple 
times. It is likely that it will occur during the life of the project. 
Risk Event Severity 
• Very Low: Safety, cost, and/or schedule impact would be insignificant, very little impact on scope 
and quality issues would barely be noticeable. 
• Low: Safety, cost, and/or schedule impact would be less than 5% (total project), scope would be 
affected in only minor areas or the quality impact would be noticeable in only the most demanding 
applications. 
• Moderate: Safety, cost, and/or schedule impacts would be in the 5% to 10% range (total project), 
major areas of scope would be affected or quality reductions would require DOE approval. 
• High: Safety, cost, and/or schedule impacts would be in the 10% to 20% range, scope impacts 
would be unacceptable to the DOE or quality impacts would be unacceptable to the DOE. 
• Very High: Safety, cost, and/or schedule impacts would be greater than 20% or the project 
deliverable is effectively useless or unusable. 
Therefore the most serious risks (Very High Risk) would have a “Very Likely” probability of 
occurrence with “Very High” severity (consequences). 
3.1 Risk Category Matrix 
The IPT shall utilize judgment and experience to evaluate each risk element and assess its severity 
and probability. As shown in the table Risk Category Matrix below (Table 1), for each event, the team 
must categorize each risk based on its severity and probability resulting in Risk Categories from Very 
Low Risk to Very High Risk as explained below. 
Table 1. Risk category matrix. 
Probability/Severity Very Low Low Moderate High Very High 
Very Likely M H H VH VH 
Likely M M H H VH 
Possible L M M H H 
Unlikely VL L M M H 
Very Unlikely VL VL L M H 
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Risk Categories 
• Very Low Risk: Normal management practices are sufficient. 
• Low Risk: Normal management practices should be sufficient, but project team awareness should 
be maintained. 
• Moderate Risk: Project team should consider each risk event and should exercise their best 
judgment. Strong consideration should be given to address the risk elements in the Risk 
Management Plan with actions deemed appropriate by the project team. 
• High Risk: The project team shall perform sufficient analysis to assure the event is understood and 
appropriate action(s) identified. Risk handling actions are mandatory and shall be addressed in the 
Risk Management Plan. Continual tracking of these risks and their associated actions is 
appropriate. 
• Very High Risk: The project team shall perform sufficient analysis to assure the event is 
understood and appropriate mitigation(s) identified. Risk handling actions are mandatory and shall 
be addressed in the Risk Management Plan. Continual tracking of these risks and their mitigating 
actions is essential. 
Risk Assessment Forms shall be prepared for each risk evaluated and included in Appendix B of 
this Risk Management Plan. 
4. RISK MITIGATION PLANS 
A risk management approach (mitigation plan) is developed for each “Moderate,” “High,” and 
“Very High” risk element and documented on the Risk Assessment Forms. 
Risk Mitigation Plans are identified on the Risk Assessment Forms in Appendix B. The 
probability, consequences, and risk levels identified on the Risk Form are the residual values assuming 
mitigation actions are effective. For “Low” and “Very Low” risk elements and “Moderate” risk elements 
not judged to require documented mitigation plans, the SBW Federal Project Manager may use normal 
management functions and work processes to control risk mitigation. 
Risk Mitigation Plans should be produced with the participation of the IPT utilizing the “what if” 
approach. Mitigation could be as simple as seeing that an executive-level relationship is established with 
Environmental Management (EM), to as complex as replanning a project activity to maintain adequate 
schedule float. General categories to mitigate risk are as follows: 
• Avoidance 
• Reduction 
• Transfer 
• Sharing 
• Acceptance and Management 
• Insurance. 
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Response to risk should fall within these categories but actions required in the mitigation plans 
should be more specific. Mitigation plans included in Appendix B were developed by the IPT and 
represent DOE efforts to ensure that technical and programmatic risks do not delay the project or result in 
additional cost.  
5. CONTINGENCY ANALYSIS 
Project contingency was evaluated by the IPT for both contractor and DOE risks to schedule and 
cost. The contractor’s Risk Management Plan assesses the contractor risks. The DOE GFSI risks are 
evaluated in this document.  
Schedule risks were evaluated in both days and related costs. For each schedule risk, the time when 
the risk was expected to occur was identified and an anticipated project baseline cost for that time was 
applied. The basis column in the Risk List (Appendix A) defines the project baseline cost applied for each 
schedule risk. 
The hotel load used in the risk management process was determined by evaluating the potential 
scenarios that may be faced as various risks occur. Fiscal years FY-07 – FY-09 contain the majority of 
project costs with only a minor component left in FY-10 as the project winds down in the first quarter of 
that year. Taking the 3 key years for fabrication, construction, and testing there is a direct total project 
cost of $188M. Divide that by 36 months and you arrive at an average $5.2M per month in the project 
burn rate.  
In this risk management plan when schedule delays were considered, they were limited to impacts 
on the critical path. As the Integrated Project Team (IPT) evaluated each risk, they considered various 
alternatives to employ for risks that occur. The evaluation provided an impact to the critical path for each 
risk. By limiting schedule impacts to those that hit the critical path, determining the hotel load becomes 
an evaluation of overall impacts to the project vs. individual impacts to multiple disciplines. 
In considering the burn rate of $5.2M (direct - without G&A), two factors influence the final hotel 
load. First, material costs are not a factor in the hotel load. Accordingly material costs are deducted from 
the burn rate. Secondly, if the delay is long enough, construction labor would be turned down until the 
risk response actions were completed. For this hotel load determination the project has decided to use 
30 days as the break point for reducing construction labor costs. If a risk takes longer than 30 days, then 
the construction labor costs are deducted from the burn rate. 
To adjust the burn rate down to an appropriate hotel load, the material costs were determined to be 
12.6% of the direct TPC. For risks less than 30 days in duration, the hotel load is $5.2M - $0.6M = 
$4.6M/month. For those risks longer than 30 days, an additional reduction in the construction labor costs 
is added. Construction labor costs were determined to be 16.4% of the direct TPC. For risks longer than 
30 days, the hotel load is $5.2M - $1.5M = $3.7M/month. 
The IPT uses an 80% confidence level of the combined schedule and cost values to measure risk 
contingency values. Prior to approval of the performance baseline (Critical Decision-2) project cost 
contingency was evaluated during a joint meeting of the Contractor Management Team and the Integrated 
Project Team for both contractor and DOE risks to schedule and cost. At that time, the contractor cost and 
schedule risk value was $41.3M and the DOE cost and schedule risk contingency value was $39.0M. The 
contractor cost and schedule risk value of $41.3M was retained in the performance baseline as the 
contractor’s management reserve for risk contingency. The DOE cost and schedule risk value of $39.0M 
has been retained in the performance baseline as the DOE Contingency. The performance baseline for the 
project was approved in December 2006 (Garman 2006). The project will continue to manage to the 
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performance baseline and change control thresholds identified in PLN-1963, “Idaho Cleanup Project 
Sodium-Bearing Waste Treatment Project Execution Plan.” 
Prior to approval of construction (Critical Decision-3) project cost contingency was evaluated 
during a joint meeting of the Contractor Management Team and the Integrated Project Team for both 
contractor and DOE risks to schedule and cost. At CD-3, the contractor cost and schedule risk value was 
$32.8M and the DOE cost and schedule risk contingency value is $39.6M. 
Prior to approval of the performance baseline (Critical Decision-2), the schedule contingency 
values for the contractor and DOE were 197 and 221 days respectively. These risks occur concurrently. 
Evaluating the worst case 221-day impact indicated about 7 months were needed in schedule contingency. 
Per DOE O 413.3A and the External Independent Review Team’s recommendations, the 7 months of 
schedule contingency were added to the end of the last critical path activity, Critical Decision-4. 
However, given the nature of the ICP contract, the project working schedule remained unchanged 
(CD-4:12/09) and the schedule contingency was reflected in the Project Data Sheet and approved 
schedule baseline in PLN-1963, “Idaho Cleanup Project Sodium-Bearing Waste Treatment Project 
Execution Plan.”.  
Prior to approval of construction (Critical Decision-3) the schedule contingency values for the 
contractor and DOE are 134 and 231 days respectively. These risks occur concurrently. 
The approach to developing cost contingency for residual risk impacts identifies probabilities of 
variance for each cost element impacted, and for factors that are global, such as labor productivity, as 
applicable. Prior to application of contingency, the confidence level(s) of a residual risk cost estimate are 
obtained by running a risk assessment simulation. Contingency is established using this Monte Carlo 
simulation model (Appendix C). Monte Carlo analysis is a quantitative simulation technique involving 
the following steps:  
• The first step is to develop a capital cost estimate.  
• The second step is to identify the Best Case, Worst Case, and Most Likely probability ranges.  
• The third step is to analyze the estimate with simulation.  
• Finally, all the risks are considered in an integrated fashion with ICP management and the SBW 
IPT to determine the contractor management reserve amount and the DOE contingency for the 
project (captured on the PDS). 
All data used in the Monte Carlo simulation runs come from the Integrated Project Team in its risk 
review sessions. The data is constructed from subject matter judgment and consensus review by the team. 
In general, probability distribution curves are developed for each risk using the best case, most likely, and 
worst case values. When the most likely value is toward the middle of the range, a triangle distribution 
curve is used. In cases where the most likely value tends toward either the best case or worst case value a 
beta distribution curve is used. Given the subjective nature of risk evaluations, no hard and fast rules for 
beta distribution input have been established. However, the beta curve is adjusted so the curve represents 
the best judgment of the risk team relative to best case, most likely, and worst case values. Minor 
adjustments to Monte Carlo input that may be more precise have little effect on the final risk value when 
an 80% confidence level is used. 
Relative to schedule analysis, a Monte Carlo simulation provides recommended schedule 
contingency for various levels of confidence. Typically, DOE projects look for 80% confidence added to 
the schedule. Three activity duration values (optimistic, most likely, pessimistic) form the basic input for 
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the analysis (Appendix C). Just as in the cost analysis, the schedule contingency is considered in an 
integrated fashion with the ICP schedule. 
Another approach to schedule contingency may be as simple as adding resources, replanning work, 
and constructability review and implementation. 
6. SUMMARY/CONCLUSIONS 
Since the start of the project, ten DOE-owned risks have been identified by the IPT and are 
summarized in Appendix A. Five of these risks have been mitigated, accepted, or removed from the 
analysis because they are outside the scope of the project. Risk mitigation plans have been developed and 
are being implemented for each of the five remaining DOE-owned risks. The Monte Carlo based 
simulations generated a most likely cost risk of $39.6M, and a most likely schedule risk of 231 days. 
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RISK ASSESSMENT FORM 
Risk # IWTU-DOE-001 Risk Title: External - DOE adds requirements beyond those required by 
Code of Record 
 
A.  Statement of Risk CLOSED – RISK ACCEPTED, EM-1 APPROVED PATH 
FORWARD ACTION MEMORANDUM ON FEBRUARY 27, 2006. MEMORANDUM 
CONFIRMED FACILITY PERFORMANCE CATEGORIZATION. 
Requirements beyond those required in the ICP-DOE contract may be imposed by DOE on the ICP 
contractor.  
 
B.  Assumptions  
Although DOE reviews during development of the design occur and have so far proven to be effective, 
additional requirements may arise later in the life of the project. 
 
C.  Uncertainties  
None 
 
D.  Probability 
 
  Very Unlikely      Unlikely       Possible      Likely      Very Likely 
 
E.  Consequences 
Depending on the project design and/or construction stage the impacts may range up to high.  
 
 Cost Schedule Comments 
Best    
Most Likely    
Worst    
 
  Very Low      Low      Moderate      High      Very High 
 
F.  Risk Level 
 
  Very Low      Low      Moderate     High      Very High 
 
G.  Comments 
 
Final decisions concerning applicable standards and orders should be achieved at the time of CD-2 
approval. Schedule delays would be incurred while the analysis and any subsequent change actions 
occur. 
 
Risk is accepted. Mitigation actions (see below), including implementation of the Regulatory Uncertainty 
Mitigation Strategy, reduced the risk. However, a long-term risk of changes to the Code of Record and/or 
legal requirements still exists. As specific risks are identified, they will be evaluated. 
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H.  Mitigation Plan 
Mitigation Actions 
Scheduled 
Implementation Responsibility Current Status 
Plan to freeze requirements, codes, and standards 
when CD-2 is approved 
SEP 7, 2006 Joel Case / 
Keith Lockie 
Complete – LST-
22-002  issued 
EM-1 approved Path Forward Action Memorandum 
on February 27, 2006. Memorandum confirmed 
Facility Performance Categorization. 
FEB 27, 2006 Joel Case / 
Keith Lockie 
Complete 
DNFSB briefed on March 3, 2006, regarding safety 
basis approach. EM-1 Letter to DNFSB 
documenting results of briefing will be submitted by 
April 1, 2006. 
APR 1, 2006 Joel Case / 
Keith Lockie 
Complete 
Continue engagement of DOE-HQ and EM-3 to 
resolve safety basis approach for IWTU. Weekly 
teleconferences are held with EM-3 to work hazard 
categorization and performance category approach. 
MAR 15, 2006 Joel Case  Complete 3/15/06 
PDSA is scheduled to be approved by DOE-ID 
April 20, 2006. 
APR 20, 2006 Joel Case Complete 5/26/05 
The final determination of hazard categorization and 
performance categorization will be completed by 
April 20, 2006. 
APR 20, 2006 Joel Case Complete 3/23/06 
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RISK ASSESSMENT FORM 
Risk # IWTU-DOE-002 Risk Title: External - SBW is determined to be HLW. 
 
A.  Statement of Risk - RISK IS NOT EVALUATED IN THE MONTE CARLO 
ANALYSIS AS IT IS OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THIS PROJECT. 
A DOE waste determination for sodium bearing waste is needed to allow SBW Treated product disposal 
at WIPP. Absent a TRU waste determination, SBW would not be allowed to be disposed in WIPP. 
 
B.  Assumptions  
SBW will be determined to be TRU Waste and will be disposed at WIPP. 
 
C.  Uncertainties  
The outcome of the DOE-HQ Waste Determination.  
 
D.  Probability 
 
  Very Unlikely      Unlikely      Possible      Likely      Very Likely 
 
E.  Consequences 
If the SBW is determined to be HLW, the decisions will not be made until FY 2009. The Project conducted 
pilot plant testing for a mineralized waste form. In the event the SBW is determined to be HLW the project 
would be re-baselined.  
 
 Cost Schedule Comments 
Best    
Most Likely    
Worst    
 
  Very Low      Low      Moderate      High      Very High 
 
F.  Risk Level 
 
  Very Low      Low      Moderate     High      Very High 
 
G.  Comments 
This Risk is not evaluated in the Monte Carlo Analysis as it is outside the scope of this project. 
 
H.  Mitigation Plan   
Mitigation Actions 
Scheduled 
Implementation Responsibility Current Status 
EM-HQ develop draft Waste Determination 
Criteria for TRU Tank Waste Disposal at WIPP, in 
coordination with Idaho and ORP. 
OCTOBER, 2007 Keith Lockie Ongoing 
EM-HQ determine public review process for 
criteria acceptance. 
DECEMBER, 
2007 
Keith Lockie Ongoing 
EM-HQ complete public review process for Waste 
Determination Criteria. 
JUNE, 2008 Keith Lockie Planned 
DOE-ID draft SBW Waste Determination.  OCTOBER, 2008 Keith Lockie Planned 
EM-HQ issue SBW Waste Determination. DECEMBER, 
2008 
Keith Lockie Planned 
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RISK ASSESSMENT FORM 
Risk # IWTU-DOE-003 Risk Title: External - WIPP RCRA Class 3 Permit modification to allow 
disposal of SBW Treated Product is not obtained. 
 
A.  Statement of Risk: Future Consideration – no impact to capital project 
The Department’s preferred disposal path for this waste is WIPP. The Department will perform a waste 
determination and pursue the appropriate regulatory approvals from EPA and the New Mexico 
Environment Department, to allow disposal of the sodium-bearing waste to WIPP. Until such time as the 
waste determination is made and the regulatory approvals are obtained, the Department will manage the 
waste to permit disposal at WIPP or at the repository planned for Yucca Mountain. However, if DOE 
makes a formal Waste Determination, the approval to ship the solidified SBW Treated Product may be 
delayed by EPA or the State of New Mexico. 
 
B.  Assumptions  
1. This risk is outside the Capital Project therefore there is no risk to the Capital Project,  
2. The Project needs to continue to work to obtain the permit in time to complete the transfer of the 
waste product to WIPP by September 2012. 
 
C.  Uncertainties  
Political and Regulatory environments are uncertain at this time. 
 
D.  Probability 
Although a formal waste determination is necessary, other regulatory and legal issues may delay SBW 
Treated Product disposal at WIPP 
 
  Very Unlikely      Unlikely      Possible      Likely      Very Likely 
 
E.  Consequences 
If the WIPP RCRA Class 3 Permit modification is not obtained, ICP contract adjustments would be 
needed. However, tank closure and liquid waste treatment could still be achieved. Treated waste would 
be safely stored in RH-canisters in the constructed storage vaults. A decision on ultimate disposal could 
be deferred until the permit issue is resolved. 
 
 Cost Schedule Comments 
Best    
Most Likely    
Worst    
 
  Very Low      Low      Moderate      High      Very High 
 
F.  Risk Level 
 
  Very Low      Low      Moderate     High      Very High 
 
G.  Comments 
This risk is not evaluated in the Monte Carlo Analysis as it is outside the scope of the Capital Project. 
Work closely with WIPP to satisfy regulatory issues and needs. DOE-HQ is developing a coordinated 
schedule for TRU Waste Determination criteria, individual TRU Waste Determinations, and Class 3 PMR 
submittals. 
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H.  Mitigation Plan – 
Mitigation Actions 
Scheduled 
Implementation Responsibility Current Status 
Following issuance of the SBW Waste 
Determination (See DOE-002 Mitigation Strategy) 
coordinate with CFBO, Class III Permit 
Modification request to allow acceptance of INTEC 
Tank Farm Waste Product (SBW) at WIPP.  
DECEMBER 
2008 
Jerry Wells Ongoing 
Coordinate NMED review and approval of Class 
III Permit Modification request. 
DECEMBER, 
2010 
Jerry Wells Ongoing 
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RISK ASSESSMENT FORM 
 
Risk # IWTU-DOE-004  Risk Title: External - EIS Record of Decision not achieved by 
December 2005 
 
A.  Statement of Risk: CLOSED – RISK MITIGATED 
A Record of Decision for the 2002 HLW EIS is necessary to proceed with the steam reformer treatment 
option for SBW. 
 
B.  Assumptions  
None 
 
C.  Uncertainties  
None  
 
D.  Probability 
Delay of the ROD is possible 
 
  Very Unlikely      Unlikely      Possible      Likely      Very Likely 
 
E.  Consequences 
Ability to meet project schedule objectives will be severely impacted depending on the time delay. 
 
 Cost Schedule Comments 
Best    
Most Likely    
Worst    
 
  Very Low      Low      Moderate     High      Very High 
 
F.  Risk Level 
 
  Very Low      Low      Moderate     High      Very High 
 
G.  Comments 
Drafts of the ROD have been reviewed at DOE-ID and DOE-HQ. Revisions are now underway. 
 
ROD issued on December 13, 2005. 
 
H.  Mitigation Plan 
Mitigation Actions 
Scheduled 
Implementation Responsibility 
Current 
Status 
Schedule shows ROD approval by EM-1 by 12/2/05. DEC 2, 2005 Joel Case Complete 
DOE-ID NEPA compliance officer at HQ 11/2 – 11/10 to 
work with GC/EH and EM on finalizing ROD. 
NOV 10, 2005 Jack 
Depperschmidt 
Complete 
Project staff at DOE HQ November 14-18 to obtain EH-1/GC 
and EM-1 concurrence. A one-week contingency is included to 
obtain final approval. 
DEC 13, 2005 Richard 
Kimmel 
Complete 
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RISK ASSESSMENT FORM 
Risk # IWTU-DOE-005 Risk Title: External - DOE Operational Readiness Review delays 
approval of start of operations 
 
A.  Statement of Risk  
DOE’s Operational Readiness Review may identify project issues that have not been adequately 
addressed, and may delay start of operations. 
 
B.  Assumptions  
Significant facility and system design and operating issues are very likely to be identified and resolved at 
earlier stages of the project and are unlikely to arise during the Operational Readiness Review (ORR). 
Therefore additional design, procurement, and construction activities will not be required. 
 
C.  Uncertainties  
ORR reviewers are independent of the IPT and contractor’s Project Team and may not agree with 
resolutions and may identify additional issues not previously evaluated.  
 
D.  Probability 
 
  Very Unlikely      Unlikely       Possible      Likely      Very Likely 
 
E.  Consequences 
Depending on the issues identified, schedule delay impacts may range from 1-3 months. 
 
 Cost Schedule Comments 
Best $0 0 Days  
Most Likely $0 30 days $4.6M/mo Hotel Load 
Worst $0 90 days $3.7M/mo Hotel Load 
 
  Very Low      Low      Moderate      High      Very High 
 
F.  Risk Level 
 
  Very Low      Low      Moderate     High      Very High 
 
G.  Comments 
 
DOE-ID Operations and Safety organizations will have been engaged in the system design and testing 
since early project stages.  
 
H.  Mitigation Plan 
Mitigation Actions 
Scheduled 
Implementation Responsibility Current Status 
Continued engagement of DOE-ID Operations and 
Safety organizations in the system design reviews 
and testing activities. 
Ongoing Joel Case Ongoing 
DOE-ID Operations and Safety organizations to 
participate in test activities conducted before the 
DOE ORR. 
IWMILE 166 
AUG 29, 2009 
Joel Case Planned 
Engage the DOE ORR Team prior to the SAT to 
enable the team to become familiar with the systems 
and operations. 
IWTS03180 
JUL 24, 2009 
Joel Case Planned 
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RISK ASSESSMENT FORM 
Risk # IWTU-DOE-006 Risk Title: External/Internal - DOE delays approval of Critical 
Decision(s) 
 
A.  Statement of Risk  
The Critical Decision dates scheduled for the project may be delayed due to impasse between DOE and 
the contractor or a change to the long-lead procurement (LLP)/early site work (ESW) approval process in 
the Project Execution Plan (PEP). 
 
B.  Assumptions  
1. DOE will approve Critical Decisions to support the project critical path schedule. 
2. DOE will approve Long-Lead Procurements/Early Starts to support the project critical path 
schedule. 
3. PEP revised to include DOE O 413.3A implementation strategy. 
 
C.  Uncertainties  
1. DOE O 413.3A requirements are open for interpretation.  
 
D.  Probability 
 
  Very Unlikely      Unlikely       Possible      Likely      Very Likely 
 
E.  Consequences 
Schedule delay impacts may range from 1-3 months. 
 
 Cost Schedule Comments 
Best $0 0 Days  
Most Likely $0 30 days $4.6M/mo Hotel Load 
Worst $0 90 days $3.7M/mo Hotel Load 
 
  Very Low      Low      Moderate      High      Very High 
 
F.  Risk Level 
 
  Very Low      Low      Moderate     High      Very High 
 
G.  Comments 
 
The DOE IPT has been actively engaged in the CD Process since early project stages. Weekly calls 
between the IPT and EM-3 ensure DOE-HQ is apprised of any current project issues or challenges. 
Meetings with the Office of Performance Assessment have resolved the approach for long leads/early 
starts required by the Project. CD-2/3B was approved by the Under Secretary of Energy on 
December 29, 2006.  
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H.  Mitigation Plan 
Mitigation Actions 
Scheduled 
Implementation Responsibility Current Status 
The Acquisition Strategy will be revised to 
include Long Leads and Early Starts as part 
of the Project Acquisition Approach. The 
Acquisition Strategy will be sent from DOE-
ID to EM-1 for approval by June 30, 2006. 
JUN 26, 2006 Integrated 
Project Team 
Complete 
EM-1 approved LLP-1 and the Acquisition 
Strategy on July 5, 2006. 
JUN 26, 2006 Integrated 
Project Team 
Complete 
Obtain approval of EIR Team for LLP-2, 
LLP-3 and ESW acquisition approach based 
on scheduled dates for package review and 
approval. 
IWPM0145 
AUG 31, 2006 
Integrated 
Project Team 
Complete 
Continue discussions with EM-3 to ensure 
Acquisition Approach is successful. 
DEC 29, 2006 Joel Case Complete 
Resolve EIR Findings and obtain OECM/EM 
concurrence for CD-2 approval. 
IWPM0165 
OCT 31, 2006 
Joel Case Complete 
Obtain LLP-2 package approval. IWSW420 
JAN 11, 2007 
Joel Case Complete 
Obtain LLP-3 package approval.  IWSW520 
APR 24, 2007 
Joel Case Complete 
Obtain ESW Mobilization approval. JAN 18, 2007 Joel Case Complete 
Obtain ESW-1 approval. MAR 7, 2007 Joel Case Complete 
Obtain ESW-2 approval. MAR 7, 2007 Joel Case Complete 
Obtain ESW-3 approval. MAY 30, 2007 Joel Case Complete 
Obtain ESW-4 approval. AUG 21, 2007 Joel Case On Schedule 
Obtain CD-3 approval. AUG 31, 2007 Joel Case On Schedule 
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RISK ASSESSMENT FORM 
Risk # IWTU-DOE-007 Risk Title: External - DNFSB 2004-2 implementation for active 
ventilation system 
 
A. Statement of Risk  
Implementation of DNFSB 2004-2 may require a change to the current IWTU design from passive 
confinement, post-NPH event, to active ventilation.  
 
B. Assumptions  
Discussions with the DNFSB and DOE-HQ have indicated that the IWTU ventilation/confinement design 
is acceptable. 
 
C. Uncertainties  
DNFSB 2004-2 implementation plan assessment guidance has not been implemented for IWTU. 
 
D. Probability 
 
  Very Unlikely      Unlikely       Possible      Likely      Very Likely 
 
E. Consequences 
Schedule delay of 10 months and cost increase of $25M for re-design and implementation to upgrade to 
active ventilation.  
 
 Cost Schedule Comments 
Best $0 0 days  
Most Likely $0 0 days  
Worst $25M 210 days $25M Capital plus $3.7M/mo Hotel Load 
 
  Very Low      Low      Moderate      High      Very High 
 
F. Risk Level 
 
  Very Low      Low      Moderate     High      Very High 
 
G. Comments 
DOE HQ and the DNFSB have been involved in project reviews and briefings 
 
H. Mitigation Plan 
Mitigation Actions 
Scheduled 
Implementation Responsibility Current Status 
Continue discussions with DOE-HQ and 
involvement of the DNFSB to ensure IWTU 
Design is accepted. 
ONGOING Joel Case On Schedule 
Execute DNFSB 2004-2 implementation Plan 
actions for IWTU. 
TBD Joel Case After issuance of 
updated guidance 
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RISK ASSESSMENT FORM 
Risk # IWTU-DOE-008 Risk Title: External/Internal -10 CFR 851 Implementation for 
construction subcontractor may delay the critical path schedule 
 
A. Statement of Risk  Closed – Risk Mitigated, Constructor will follow the CWI 
10 CFR 851 Plan, which was approved in May 2007. 
10 CFR 851 was issued in June 2006 with compliance required complex-wide by May 2007. Risk is that 
the sub contractor performing the IWTU construction will not have or be able to obtain a compliant 
program to support the construction schedule. 
 
B. Assumptions  
 
None  
 
C. Uncertainties  
 
None 
 
D. Probability 
 
  Very Unlikely      Unlikely       Possible      Likely      Very Likely 
 
E. Consequences 
 
 Cost Schedule Comments 
Best    
Most Likely    
Worst    
 
  Very Low      Low      Moderate      High      Very High 
 
F. Risk Level 
 
  Very Low      Low      Moderate     High      Very High 
 
G. Comments 
 
H. Mitigation Plan 
Mitigation Actions 
Scheduled 
Implementation Responsibility Current Status 
Prequalification planning will alert interested 
constructors of project requirements, including 
10 CFR 851, and allow constructors additional time 
to prepare compliant programs. 
IWCO9003 
OCT 25, 2006 
Mike Cain Complete 
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RISK ASSESSMENT FORM 
Risk # IWTU-DOE-009 Risk Title: External –Post-Seismic Monitoring capability is required 
 
A. Statement of Risk   
Post-Seismic monitoring is not requirement of the ICP Contract and is not included in the design of the 
IWTU. Post-seismic monitoring was encouraged by the DNFSB in the January 24, 2007, CD-2/3B letter to 
EM-1.  
 
B. Assumptions  
 
1. Post-Seismic monitoring is not required per DOE Guide 420.1-1.  
2. Incorporation of post-seismic monitoring would be a directed change.  
3. Incorporation of post-seismic monitoring can be post CD-3. 
4. Incorporation of post-seismic monitoring would require a separate control system that would be 
seismically qualified. 
 
C. Uncertainties  
 
Incorporation of post-seismic monitoring capability into the control system design was encouraged by the 
DNSFB in the January 24, 2007, letter. DNFSB does not approve design, but recommendations 
suggested by DNFSB may result in a directed change to incorporate. 
 
D. Probability 
 
  Very Unlikely      Unlikely       Possible      Likely      Very Likely 
 
E. Consequences 
 
 Cost Schedule Comments 
Best $0 0 days  
Most Likely $0 0 days  
Worst $3M 120 days $3M capital cost plus $3.7M/mon Hotel Load (30+ days) 
 
  Very Low      Low      Moderate      High      Very High 
 
F. Risk Level 
 
  Very Low      Low      Moderate     High      Very High 
 
G. Comments 
 
H. Mitigation Plan 
Mitigation Actions 
Scheduled 
Implementation Responsibility Current Status 
Continue discussions with DOE-HQ and 
involvement of the DNFSB to ensure IWTU design 
is accepted. 
September 2007, 
concurrent with 
CD-3 approval 
Joel Case On schedule 
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RISK ASSESSMENT FORM 
Risk # IWTU-DOE-010 Risk Title: External/Internal – Full Application of ISA 84.00.01 is 
required for the IWTU control System 
 
A. Statement of Risk   
ISA 84.00.01 is a risk based standard that requires additional evaluations based on consequences. 
During the hazard and risk assessment phase, the process risk is compared to the tolerable risk to 
determine the amount of risk reduction that must be provided by various safety functions. The safety 
functions are then allocated to different systems, such as the Basic Process Control System (BPCS), 
Safety Instrumented System (SIS), external fire and gas systems, etc. When a safety function is allocated 
to the SIS, it is called a Safety Instrumented Function (SIF). The allocation process also includes 
assigning a Safety Integrity Level (SIL) to the SIF, which corresponds to the amount of risk reduction that 
was determined to be necessary in the hazard and risk analysis. The current design of the IWTU Control 
System complies with ISA-84.00.01 and full application is not requirement of the ICP Contract and is not 
included in the design of the IWTU. However, full application has been questioned by the DNFSB. 
 
B. Assumptions  
 
1. Full application of ISA-84.00.01 does not apply to the design of the IWTU control system based 
on Hazardous Chemical Inventories.  
2. Full application of ISA-84.00.01 does not apply to the design of the IWTU control system as the 
Radiological consequences are relatively low.  
3. Incorporation can be post CD-3. 
4. Incorporation of would be a directed change. 
 
C. Uncertainties  
 
Full application of ISA 84.00.01 has been questioned by the DNSFB staff. DNFSB does not approve 
design, but recommendations suggested by DNFSB may result in a directed change to incorporate. 
 
D. Probability 
 
  Very Unlikely      Unlikely       Possible      Likely      Very Likely 
 
E. Consequences 
 
 Cost Schedule Comments 
Best $0 0 days  
Most Likely $0 0 days  
Worst $3M 180 days $3M capital cost plus $3.7M/mon Hotel Load (30+ days) 
 
  Very Low      Low      Moderate      High      Very High 
 
F. Risk Level 
 
  Very Low      Low      Moderate     High      Very High 
 
G. Comments 
 
  B-16
H. Mitigation Plan 
Mitigation Actions 
Scheduled 
Implementation Responsibility Current Status 
Continue discussions with DOE-HQ and 
involvement of the DNFSB to ensure IWTU 
control system  design is accepted. 
August 2007, 
concurrent with 
CD-3 approval 
Joel Case On schedule 
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Appendix C 
 
Monte Carlo Analysis Results 
Forecast: DOE Risk $
Summary:
Entire range is from 3,311 to 89,325
Base case is 116,100
After 5,000 trials, the std. error of the mean is 185
Percentiles: Forecast values
0% 3,311
10% 14,407
20% 17,730
30% 20,591
40% 23,639
50% 26,956
60% 30,414
70% 34,478
80% 39,593
90% 47,544
100% 89,325  
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Forecast: DOE Risk Days
Summary:
Entire range is from 27 to 447
Base case is 690
After 5,000 trials, the std. error of the mean is 1
Percentiles: Forecast values
0% 27
10% 92
20% 114
30% 132
40% 149
50% 165
60% 184
70% 205
80% 231
90% 268
100% 447
End of Forecasts  
 
Assumption: DOE-005 DOE Operational Readiness Review delays approval of start of operations (=B2)
Percentiles: Assumption values Distribution
10% 2,256 2,260
90% 8,457 8,414
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Assumption: DOE-005 DOE Operational Readiness Review delays approval of start of operations (K2) (=B2)
Percentiles: Assumption values Distribution
10% 13 14
90% 60 60
 
 
Assumption: DOE-006 DOE delays approval of Critical Decision(s) (=B3)
Percentiles: Assumption values Distribution
10% 2,279 2,260
90% 8,373 8,414  
 
Assumption: DOE-006 DOE delays approval of Critical Decision(s) (K3) (=B3)
Percentiles: Assumption values Distribution
10% 13 14
90% 60 60  
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Assumption: DOE-007 DNFSB 2004-2 implementation for active ventilation system (=B4)
Percentiles: Assumption values Distribution
10% 1 1
90% 109 112  
 
Assumption: DOE-007 DNFSB 2004-2 implementation for active ventilation system (H4) (=B4)
Percentiles: Assumption values Distribution
10% 229 227
90% 27,209 27,073  
 
Assumption: DOE-009 Post Seismic Monitoring capability is required (=B5)
Percentiles: Assumption values Distribution
10% 79 79
90% 9,239 9,467  
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Assumption: DOE-009 Post Seismic Monitoring capability is required (K5) (=B5)
Percentiles: Assumption values Distribution
10% 1 1
90% 63 64  
 
Assumption: DOE-010 Full Application of ISA 84.00.01 is required for the IWTU control System (=B6)
Percentiles: Assumption values Distribution
10% 116 112
90% 13,470 13,403  
 
Assumption: DOE-010 Full Application of ISA 84.00.01 is required for the IWTU control System (K6) (=B6)
Percentiles: Assumption values Distribution
10% 1 1
90% 98 96
End of Assumptions  
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Appendix D 
 
Risk Register 
Number Scenario Risks Identified Category of Risk Sub-Category Assumptions Uncertainties 
DOE-001 DOE adds requirements beyond those 
required by Code of Record. Closed - 
Risk Accepted. EM-1 approved Path 
Forward Action Memorandum on 
February 27, 2006. Memorandum 
confirmed Facility Performance 
Categorization.  
• Critical Path 
Schedule 
slippage 
• Cost increase to 
redesign 
External Requirements Although DOE reviews during 
development of the design occur and 
have so far proven to be effective, 
additional requirements may arise later 
in the life of the project. 
None 
DOE-002 SBW is determined to be HLW. Risk 
removed from the Monte Carlo 
Analysis. In the event the SBW is 
determined to be HLW the project 
would be re-baselined. 
• Critical Path 
Schedule 
slippage 
• Cost increase to 
redesign 
External • Requirements 
• Political 
SBW will be determined to be TRU 
Waste and will be disposed at WIPP. 
The outcome of the DOE-HQ 
Waste Determination 
DOE-003 WIPP RCRA Class 3 Permit modification 
to allow disposal of SBW Treated 
Product is not obtained. Future 
Consideration - no impact to capital 
project. 
Cost increase post 
Capital Project 
External • Requirements 
• Political 
• This risk is outside the Capital 
Project therefore there is no risk to 
the Capital Project.  
• The Project needs to continue to 
work to obtain the permit in time to 
complete the transfer of the waste 
product to WIPP by 
September 2012. 
Political and Regulatory 
environments are uncertain at this 
time. 
DOE-004 EIS Record of Decision not achieved by 
December 2005. Closed - Risk 
Mitigated. Record of Decision issued in 
December 2005. 
Critical Path 
Schedule slippage 
External • Requirements 
• Stakeholders 
None None 
DOE-005 DOE Operational Readiness Review 
delays approval of start of operations. 
Critical Path 
Schedule slippage 
External • Stakeholders 
• Requirements 
Significant facility and system design 
and operating issues are very likely to 
be identified and resolved at earlier 
stages of the project and are unlikely to 
arise during the Operational Readiness 
Review. Therefore additional design, 
procurement, and construction 
activities will not be required. 
ORR reviewers are independent of 
the IPT and Project Team and may 
not agree with resolutions and may 
identify additional issues not 
previously evaluated. 
(continued). 
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Number Scenario Risks Identified Category of Risk Sub-Category Assumptions Uncertainties 
DOE-006 DOE delays approval of Critical 
Decision(s). 
Critical Path 
Schedule slippage 
• External 
• Internal 
• Requirements 
• Organizational  
• DOE will approve Critical 
Decisions to support the project 
critical path schedule.  
• DOE will approve Long-Lead 
Procurements/Early Starts to 
support the project critical path 
schedule. 
• PEP revised to include 
DOE O 413.3A Implementation 
Strategy. 
• DOE O 413.3A requirements 
are open for interpretation.  
DOE-007 DNFSB 2004-2 implementation for 
active ventilation system. 
• Critical Path 
Schedule 
slippage 
• Cost increase to 
redesign 
External • Stakeholders 
• Requirements 
Discussions with the DNFSB and DOE 
HQ have indicated that the IWTU 
ventilation/confinement design is 
acceptable. 
• DNFSB 2004-2 implementation 
plan assessment guidance has 
not been implemented for 
IWTU. 
• Report has been submitted for 
IWTU but not sure if it will be 
accepted or who will accept. 
DOE-008 10 CFR 851 Implementation for 
construction subcontractor may delay the 
critical path schedule. Closed - Risk 
Mitigated. Constructor will follow the 
CWI 10 CFR 851 Plan, which was 
approved by DOE in May 2007. 
Critical Path 
Schedule slippage 
• External 
• Internal 
Requirements None None 
DOE-009 Post-Seismic Monitoring capability is 
required. 
• Critical Path 
Schedule 
slippage 
• Cost Increase 
due to redesign 
External • Stakeholders 
• Requirements 
• Post-seismic monitoring is not 
required per DOE Guide 420.1-1. 
• Incorporation of post-seismic 
monitoring would be a directed 
change. 
• Incorporation of post-seismic 
monitoring can be post CD-3. 
• Incorporation of post-seismic 
monitoring would require a separate 
control system that would be 
seismically qualified. 
• Incorporation of Post-Seismic 
Monitoring capability into the 
control system design was 
encouraged by the DNSFB in 
the January 24, 2007, letter. 
DNFSB does not approve 
design, but recommendations 
suggested by DNFSB may 
result in a directed change to 
incorporate. 
(continued). 
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Number Scenario Risks Identified Category of Risk Sub-Category Assumptions Uncertainties 
DOE-010 DNFSB does not concur with the Design 
of IWTU Control System. 
• Critical Path 
Schedule 
slippage 
• Cost Increase 
due to redesign 
• External 
• Internal 
• Stakeholders 
• Requirements 
• Full application of ISA-84.00.01 
does not apply to the design of the 
IWTU control system based on 
Hazardous Chemical Inventories. 
• Full application of ISA-84.00.01 
does not apply to the design of the 
IWTU control system as the 
radiological consequences are 
relatively low. 
• Incorporation can be post CD-3. 
• Incorporation would be a directed 
change. 
• Full application of 
ISA-84.00.01 has been 
questioned by the DNSFB staff. 
DNFSB does not approve 
design, but recommendations 
suggested by DNFSB may 
result in a directed change to 
incorporate. 
IWTU-001 Deposits form on the waste feed nozzle to 
the DM reformer and the nozzle clogs 
interrupting operations. 
• Critical Path 
Schedule 
slippage 
• Cost increase to 
redesign 
Technical • Simulation 
• Design/Eng 
• Mock-up test program demonstrates 
acceptable un-cooled feed nozzle 
design.  
• Nozzle clearing methods, (flush 
with water or acid) demonstrated at 
Hazen, are effective.  
• Un-cooled nozzles in IWTU 
baseline will be effective based on 
experience using un-cooled nozzles 
in the New Waste Calcining 
Facility.  
SAT identifies problems that were 
not identified during Mock-up 
Testing. 
IWTU-002 Scale-up of the steam reforming process 
to treat Sodium Bearing Wastes (SBW) 
could result in lower throughputs than 
planned in the design. Closed - Risk 
Mitigated by Test Program. 
Critical Path 
Schedule slippage 
Technical • Simulation 
• Design/Eng 
None None 
IWTU-003 The waste form created in the steam 
reforming process does not comply with 
WIPP Waste Acceptance Criteria 
requirements. Risk Closed - Final WIPP 
WAC has been issued. 
Cost increase to 
redesign 
• Technical 
• External 
• Operational 
• Requirements 
• Stakeholders 
None None 
IWTU-004 IWTU Environmental Permits approval 
cannot be obtained in a timely manner. 
Risk Closed - IWTU Permits issued by 
Regulatory Agencies May 2007. 
Critical Path 
Schedule slippage 
• External 
• Program 
• Stakeholders 
• Requirements 
None None 
(continued). 
 
D
-6 
Number Scenario Risks Identified Category of Risk Sub-Category Assumptions Uncertainties 
IWTU-005 Full scale SBW off-gas emissions are not 
compliant with MACT requirements or 
do not meet environmental criteria during 
the SAT. Closed - Risk Accepted. 
• Critical Path 
Schedule 
slippage  
• Cost increase to 
redesign 
• Technical 
• External 
• Simulation 
• Requirements 
• Operational 
• Design modifications are not 
required to ensure that emissions 
meet MACT requirements.  
• Additional risk modeling does not 
need to be performed. 
• Prior testing has demonstrated that 
the off-gas system design produces 
MACT compliant emissions. Hazen 
results also indicate MACT 
compliant emissions. 
Full-Scale SAT demonstrates 
unanticipated results and design 
modifications or procedural 
modifications are required. 
IWTU-006 DEQ does not issue Temporary 
Authorization for early construction. 
Closed - Risk Mitigated. TA approved 
effective March 1, 2007. 
Critical Path 
Schedule slippage 
• External 
• Internal 
• Stakeholders 
• Requirements 
• Organizational 
None None 
IWTU-007 Long Lead Procurement is denied. 
Closed - Risk Mitigated by issuance of 
CD-2/3B on December 29, 2006 
Critical Path 
Schedule slippage 
• External  
• Internal 
• Resources  
• Requirements  
• Political 
None None 
IWTU-008 Site-specific geological investigations 
identify conditions that affect seismic 
design basis. Closed - Risk Mitigated by 
issuance of Geotechnical Report in 
June 2007 and briefing EM-HQ. 
Critical Path 
Schedule slippage 
• External  
• Technical 
• Design/Eng  
• Requirements  
• Stakeholders  
• Systems 
None None 
IWTU-009 Particle size control problems. Closed - 
Risk Mitigated by Test Program. 
Cost increase to 
redesign 
Technical Simulation 
Design/Eng 
None None 
IWTU-010 Product removal equipment fails to 
function, and requires shutdown and 
manual clean out. 
• Critical Path 
Schedule 
slippage  
• Cost increase to 
redesign 
Technical • Simulation  
• Function 
• Base Technology 
• Mockup testing conducted by fill 
station vendor ensures canister 
filling capability and reliability.  
• Mockup testing conducted by vessel 
fabricator ensures product solids 
handling capability from DMR 
through canister filling.  
• Product flow properties evaluated 
by vendor to confirm design input.  
• Calcine product successfully 
transferred to Bin Sets at INTEC 
over many years. 
Transfer of steam reformed 
product solids to the RH-72B 
canister has not been demonstrated 
with either actual or simulant 
waste product solids. 
(continued). 
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IWTU-011 Actual waste received at IWTU is 
significantly different from contracted 
waste characterization data. Future 
Consideration - No impact to capital 
project 
Operations Critical 
Path Schedule 
slippage 
Technical • Operational  
• Systems 
• This risk is outside the Capital 
Project therefore there is no risk to 
the Capital Project.  
• Significant sample data is available, 
and tank homogeneity is anticipated.
Solids data is not as well known 
and could require blending in 
NWCF to control product and feed 
batch limits. Possibly impacts 
operating schedule. 
IWTU-012 Waste/Product Sampling Requirements. 
Future Consideration - No impact to 
capital project 
• Operations 
Critical Path 
Schedule 
slippage  
• Lifecycle 
(Operations) 
Cost Increase  
• Technical  
• Internal 
• Operational  
• Integration 
• This risk is outside the Capital 
Project therefore there is no risk to 
the Capital Project.  
• Significant remote laboratory 
capabilities exist at INTEC 
therefore insufficient analytical 
capabilities is very unlikely. 
If sampling requirements to meet 
WIPP acceptance criteria are 
excessive (per canister-for 
example) additional analytical 
capacity may be required and is 
likely to be costly. 
IWTU-013 Changes in MACT requirements. Closed 
- Risk Occurred. 
• Critical Path 
Schedule 
slippage  
• Cost increase to 
redesign 
• External  
• Technical 
• Requirements  
• Design/Eng 
None None 
IWTU-014 100-year flood plain. Closed - 
Mutigation Stratgey reduced residual 
Risk to Zero. 
• Critical Path 
Schedule 
slippage  
• Cost increase to 
redesign 
• External • Requirements  
• Stakeholders  
• Political 
None None 
IWTU-015 SR product density not achieved. Future 
Consideration - No impact to capital 
project. 
• Operations 
Critical Path 
Schedule 
slippage  
• Lifecycle 
(Operations) 
Cost Increase  
Technical • Operational  
• Design/Eng  
• Systems 
• This risk is outside the Capital 
Project therefore there is no risk to 
the Capital Project.  
• Shipping will occur concurrently 
with production and therefore 
additional storage space will not be 
required. 
WIPP permit and shipping 
schedules (GFSI) 
(continued). 
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IWTU-016 Availability (70%) may not be achieved. Critical Path 
Schedule slippage 
Technical • Operational  
• Simulation  
• Function 
• Normal startup problems for a new 
process may have a significant 
impact on overall availability and 
are adequately accounted for in the 
start-up schedule.  
• Hazen testing has demonstrated the 
ability to operate at higher than the 
nominal 2.5 gpm (scaled) 
throughput which will compensate 
for some maintenance delays.  
• Selected custom components will be 
successfully tested as part of the 
mockup test program. 
First of a kind facility may have 
unanticipated startup problems, 
some which could impact Site 
Acceptance Testing. 
IWTU-017 Construction/Fabrication Material 
Availability. 
• Critical Path 
Schedule 
slippage 
• Cost increase to 
Project 
• Program  
• External 
• Sequencing  
• Cost  
• Market Threat  
• Threat 
• Construction estimate includes 
realistic assumptions regarding 
escalation of material. 
• Construction estimate includes 
realistic assumptions regarding 
availability to meet the project 
schedule. 
• Vendors are capable and willing to 
produce materials capable of 
meeting project quality 
requirements. 
• Weather, political turmoil, and 
wars, affect material availability 
and costs, and may undermine 
the assumptions. 
• Vendors may not want to bid or 
cannot produce materials 
capable of meeting project 
quality requirements. 
IWTU-018 DMR-CRR operation is difficult to 
balance and control. Closed - Risk 
Mitigated by Test Program. 
• Critical Path 
Schedule 
slippage  
• Cost increase to 
redesign 
Technical • Operational  
• Design/Eng  
• Systems 
None None 
IWTU-019 Early Site Work approval is denied. 
Closed - Risk IWTU-007 Revised to 
include all Long-Lead Procurements 
and early starts proposed by the 
project. 
Critical Path 
Schedule slippage 
External • Resources  
• Requirements  
• Political 
None None 
(continued). 
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IWTU-020 Canister Filling and Closure System 
Performance not acceptable. 
• Operations 
Critical Path 
Schedule 
slippage  
• Lifecycle 
(Operations) 
Cost Increase  
• Capital Cost 
Increase 
• Critical Path 
Schedule 
slippage 
Technical • Operational 
• Design/Eng 
• Systems 
• Actual award of PO to Canister 
Filling and Closure System Vendor 
left a portion of the risk with the 
project. 
• Early Procurement of Canister 
Fill/Decon System of full-scale 
mockup can be proof-tested prior to 
simulant testing. 
• Remote canister filling and 
closure operations are 
mechanically complex, remote 
decontamination may also be 
required. 
• Proof test shows design changes 
required to meet performance 
requirements. 
• Results of proof test could 
cause redesign that affects 
project baseline. 
IWTU-021 Process Off-Gas Filter Performance. 
Closed - Risk Mitigated by Test 
Program. 
• Critical Path 
Schedule 
slippage  
• Cost increase to 
redesign 
Technical • Simulation  
• Function 
None None 
IWTU-022 Mercury emissions higher than expected 
at Hazen. Closed - Risk Mitigated by 
Test Program. 
Cost increase to 
redesign 
• Technical  
• External 
• Simulation  
• Function 
• IWTU Mercury abatement system 
design is more conservative than 
Hazen design and will provide more 
efficient mercury removal.  
• Results from Carbonate Phase 2 
testing demonstrated required 
mercury removal at Hazen. 
None 
IWTU-023 Quality Assurance not adequately 
implemented. Closed - Risk Mitigated 
by QA Planning/Program. 
Critical Path 
Schedule slippage 
• Program  
• Technical  
• Internal 
• Systems 
Eng/Quality 
None None 
(continued). 
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IWTU-024 Weather Impacts Construction Critical Path 
Schedule slippage 
Program Schedule • Construction season in Eastern 
Idaho is 8 months long.  
• Construction work in winter 
escalates costs 5%-8% for  
4–5 months each year.  
• Backfill and compaction efficiency 
drops by 1/2 during winter months 
due to the need to heat back-fill 
prior to compaction.  
• Wind exceeds 15 mph on about 
15% of the calendar days. Wind 
speeds in excess of 15 mph affect 
hoisting and rigging activities. Wind 
blows less starting in mid-summer 
through early fall.  
• Baseline schedule places civil and 
structural construction period within 
the optimal construction season.  
• Design is mature (Rev 0) to support 
ESW and CD-3 schedules. 
• Plan to winterize batch plant and 
purchase winter cover for the 
process building reduces impact to 
project. 
• Mild winter could extend 
construction season.  
• Harsh winter could shorten the 
construction season.  
• Civil and structural construction 
needs to start as scheduled. 
IWTU-025 Latent Contamination of Soils around 
NWCF (Transfer Lines and Utility 
Tie-Ins) Risk Closed - included both 
NWCF and IWTU Footprint. 
Footprint complete, added new risk 
IWTU-034 for NCWF only. 
• Critical Path 
Schedule 
slippage  
• Cost increase to 
material 
disposal 
• Program  
• Internal 
• Cost  
• Systems 
None None 
(continued). 
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IWTU-026 Limited Work Force for Construction • Critical Path 
Schedule 
slippage  
• Cost Increase to 
recruit 
construction 
staff 
Program Schedule • Labor forces required for IWTU 
Construction are available to 
support subcontractor's staffing 
plan.  
• By placing a single subcontract, 
with a larger construction company, 
the subcontractor will have the 
necessary leverage to staff the labor 
needs of the construction schedule. 
• Several years without major 
construction in Idaho forced 
workers to move elsewhere or 
work away from home.  
• Recently awarded ID State 
Roadway construction could 
utilize carpenters, ironworkers, 
laborers, operators, and 
finishers needed for IWTU.  
• The number of fitters, 
electricians, and other trades in 
the area of the work may also 
be limited. 
IWTU-027 Equipment Deliveries needed to support 
construction schedule. New risk added 
for 6 heavy lift skids. 
Critical Path 
Schedule slippage 
Program • Schedule  
• Sequencing 
• Engineered equipment can be 
fabricated and delivered in time to 
support the construction schedule.  
• Bulk Construction Materials can be 
delivered to support construction 
schedule. 
• Construction Critical Path can be 
re-sequenced to support delays in 
deliveries. 
• The timeliness and sequence of 
equipment deliveries may not 
support construction schedule. 
• The timeliness and sequence of 
bulk materials may not support 
construction schedule. 
IWTU-028 Simplied soil-structure interaction (SSI) 
analysis is non-conservative. Risk 
Realized - Full SSI Analysis is being 
performed prior to CD-3. 
• Critical Path 
Schedule 
slippage  
• Cost increase to 
redesign 
• Program  
• Technical  
• Cost  
• Design/Eng  
• Modeling  
• Systems 
None None 
(continued). 
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IWTU-029 Controls to prevent GAC Exothermic 
Reaction not sufficiently developed. 
• Critical Path 
Schedule 
slippage  
• Cost increase to 
redesign 
Technical • Design/Eng  
• Function 
• Heat up of the GAC bed after CRR 
at normal operating temperatures 
prevents hot spots from occurring. 
This was successfully demonstrated 
during Carbonate Phase 2 Testing.  
• Since IWTU does not use a natural 
gas auxiliary heat source in the 
CRR, the fuel source available at 
Hazen will not be present in the 
IWTU.  
• The normal operating temperatures 
of the GAC Bed will be far below 
ignition temperatures of GAC.  
• No additional testing of the ESTD 
mercury adsorber or off-gas system 
is required. 
• Mechanism to create hot spot 
has not been confirmed. 
• Report, when issued, is not 
accepted by DOE 
IWTU-030 IWTU Cost Estimate Accuracy Proposed baseline 
not bounding for 
project execution 
Program • Cost  
• Budget 
The Performance Baseline is bounding 
for execution of the project. 
• Maturity of preliminary design 
vs. final design.  
• Required changes identified by 
test program (Mock-up 
Testing).  
• Labor and material availability 
uncertainties are adequately 
addresses by IWTU-017 and 
IWTU-026. 
(continued). 
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IWTU-031 Scaling observed in DMR during Hazen 
testing. 
  Technical • Design/Eng  
• Field Test  
• Simulation 
• Lab Scale testing, planned for the 
project to identify cause of scaling, 
will demonstrate mitigation 
capability for the IWTU.  
• Scaling is not detrimental to the 
operation of the IWTU.  
• Use of washed coal, having low 
sulfur content, will keep scale from 
forming. 
• Rate of scale formation is 
unknown.  
• Scaling may lead to blockage of 
instrumentation sensor within 
the DMR.  
• Use of washed coal having low 
sulfur content may not prevent 
scale from forming. 
IWTU-032 NWCF Facility Modifications compete 
with Remote Handled TRU and Filter 
Leach Projects for same area at the same 
time. 
Critical Path 
Schedule slippage 
Internal • Management  
• Systems  
• Organizational 
• Close coordination of activities will 
successfully allow integration of 
numerous projects in the same area. 
Schedule performance by both 
IWTU and other projects. 
IWTU-033 Fabrication of Process Vessels and Skids 
does not meet Construction Schedule. 
Critical Path 
Schedule slippage 
Program • Schedule 
• Sequencing 
• Engineered equipment can be 
fabricated and delivered in time to 
support the construction schedule. 
• Construction Critical Path can be 
re-sequenced to support delays in 
deliveries. 
The timeliness and sequence of 
equipment deliveries may not 
support construction schedule. 
IWTU-034 Latent Contamination of Soils around 
NWCF (Transfer Lines and Utility 
Tie-Ins). 
• Critical Path 
Schedule 
slippage 
• Cost increase to 
material 
disposal 
• Program 
• Internal 
• Cost 
• Systems 
• Soil around construction area and 
NWCF is potentially radiologically 
contaminated.  
• If contamination is found, the 
construction estimate includes 
sufficient cost allocation (5% of 
material excavated will be disposed 
of at ICDF) to cover the cost of 
disposal. 
• Latent contamination and 
equipment from legacy 
operations may have 
contaminated soils around the 
NWCF.  
• Contamination may be 
discovered during excavation. 
Lightly contaminated material 
is dispositioned at ICDF. More 
highly contaminated material is 
dispositioned at other locations, 
Costs increase above budget 
estimate cost allocation. 
N/A INTEC Facility Interfaces. Not 
Evaluated - INTEC operated by same 
contractor as IWTU. 
Critical Path 
Schedule slippage 
Internal • Management  
• Systems  
• Organizational 
• Construction will be performed by a 
subcontractor in accordance with 
their plans and procedures.  
• Construction area will be outside 
INTEC Fence and treated as Green 
Field Construction. 
Some INTEC Procedures may 
apply at interfaces to various 
groups within CWI. 
(continued). 
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N/A Issuance of Documents to Construction - 
Not Evaluated - Design being 
performed by a CWI affiliate. 
Critical Path 
Schedule slippage 
• Internal  
• Technical 
• Organizational  
• Design/Eng 
• Documents required to support 
construction are issued in time to 
support the construction schedule.  
• Documents required to support 
construction have been identified 
and are scheduled to be released to 
support the construction schedule.  
• Documents issued to construction 
are mature and accurate. 
• Documents required for 
construction are not issued in a 
timely manner.  
• Documents required for 
construction are not mature or 
contain errors.  
N/A Just in Time Deliveries to Construction. 
Not Evaluated - Construction will be 
by a Subcontractor or CWI affiliate. 
Critical Path 
Schedule slippage 
• Program  
• Internal  
• Schedule  
• Resources 
• Construction will be performed by a 
single subcontractor.  
• By placing the construction 
subcontract with a single 
subcontractor, the list possible 
interested companies will be limited 
to larger firms who offer the full 
array of services including 
procurement, delivery, and 
warehousing.  
• Constructor may not be able to 
provide procurement, delivery, 
and/or warehousing services.  
N/A Funding Shortfall. Not Evaluated - 
congressional funding changes are 
considered directed changes per 
DOE O 413.3A. 
Critical Path 
Schedule slippage 
• Program  
• External 
• Budget  
• Political 
After approval of the performance 
baseline, the funding will be provided 
in accordance with the Project Data 
Sheet. 
Political turmoil and wars may 
effect funding and may undermine 
the assumption. 
N/A Union Strikes. Not Evaluated - Site 
Stabilization Agreement prohibits 
strikes by organized labor. 
Critical Path 
Schedule slippage 
• Program • Schedule • Site Stabilization Agreement 
prohibits strikes by organized labor 
and lockouts by management.  
• Site Stabilization Agreement applies 
to Construction Subcontract. 
None 
N/A DOE delays approval of Safety Basis. 
Not Evaluated - Contract requires 
review within 30 days. 
Critical Path 
Schedule slippage 
• External 
• Internal 
• Requirements 
• Organizational 
• Contract requires review with-in 
30 days. 
• Approval is by DOE-ID not 
DOE-HQ. 
• Safety Basis document transmitted 
to DOE-ID for review/approval is 
mature and meets expectations of 
DOE-ID. 
• Nuclear Safety continues to involve 
IPT in updates to PDSA and draft of 
FDSA 
• Contract may be revised. 
• Approval authority may change 
from DOE-ID to DOE-HQ. 
• Safety Basis Document is not 
mature when delivered or does 
not meet expectations. 
• Nuclear Safety does not involve 
IPT in updates to PDSA and 
draft of FDSA 
(continued). 
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N/A Failure to implement Quality Assurance 
programs results in un-acceptable 
material, conditions, equipment or 
services. Not Evaluated - QA Programs 
in place with audits and surveillances 
scheduled. 
• Critical Path 
Schedule 
slippage 
• Cost increase 
• Program 
• Technical 
• Internal 
• Systems 
Eng/Quality 
• Project Program and Procedures are 
flowed down to partners and Subs. 
• Programs and Procedures are 
implemented by partners and subs. 
• Vendors are capable of supplying 
products that meet QA 
requirements. 
• Oversight activities by CWI and 
affiliates will minimize occurrence 
of defective items 
• Vendors are not capable of 
supplying products that meet 
QA requirements 
N/A 10 CFR 851 approval for CWI may delay 
the critical path schedule. Not Evaluated 
- CWI Plan approved in May 2007. 
Critical Path 
Schedule slippage 
• External 
• Internal 
Requirements • Constructor will follow the CWI 
10 CFR 851 Plan. 
• CWI reviews and approves the 
construction subcontractor's 
10 CRF 851 compliant program.  
Approval of the CWI Plan by DOE 
will be by 5-26-07 to support the 
Construction Schedule. 
N/A Concerns raised by the DNFSB in the 
CD-2/3B acknowledgement Approval 
Letter dated January 24, 2007, are not 
resolved prior to CD-3. Not Evaluated – 
3 concerns covered by existing 
evaluated risks and 2 concerns, routine 
sampling and PDSA updates, planned 
on project schedule. 
• Critical Path 
Schedule 
slippage 
• Cost increase 
due to redesign 
• External • Requirements 
• Political 
• Frequent and ongoing 
communications with EM and 
DNFSB will resolve concerns prior 
to CD-3. 
• Requirements for Safety 
Significant SSCs are not as 
clearly defined as requirements 
for Safety Class SSCs. 
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Risk Categories 
Potential areas of consideration for risk include, but are not limited to, the categories and 
subcategories described in the following sections. 
Note, each risk category that is used by a program should be broken into at least two aspects, in 
other words, two different perspectives, to eliminate the potential of one risk dominating the planning 
process. If broken into smaller, more manageable elements, the risk potential and impact are spread, thus 
reducing the impact on the planning and executing processes.  
Risk categories are not comprehensive and are not intended as such. Examples given below are 
meant only as guidance and are not comprehensive or prescriptive. The guidance is meant to provoke 
relevant thought processes. 
E-1. PROGRAM CATEGORIES 
1. Cost: risk due to unknowns or potentially weak cost estimate. 
2. Schedule: risk due to inadequate schedule being allocated to a task, activity due to unavailability of 
human resources, or schedule failure due to delayed procurement action. 
3. Budget: risk due to budget reduction due to federal funding being cut for program or inadequate 
budget planning due to schedule unknowns. 
4. Concurrency: risk due to planning error regarding tasks that must occur concurrently, change in 
availability of various resources to allow for tasks, or activities to occur concurrently. 
5. Sequencing: risk due to failure to deliver or communicate late delivery of task product to next 
performer per schedule, thus resulting in cascading schedule risk being incurred. 
6. Scope: risk due to not fully understanding the scope or not adequately defining program metrics to 
allow various program measurement tools to adequately program issues. 
E-2. TECHNICAL CATEGORIES 
1. Design/engineering: risk due to inadequate requirements identification or incorporation into 
existing facility with inadequate as-built designs. 
2. Function: risk due to commercial-off-the-shelf parts not functioning as projected in apparatus or 
chemical fails to interact with biological simulant as predicted due to environmental conditions. 
3. Integration: risk due to interference caused by interaction of two technologies in close proximity to 
one another. 
4. State of base technology development: risk due to finding that base technology upon which 
evolving technology is based does not perform as described. 
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5. Development fabrication: risk due to inability of designated fabrication shop to fabricate necessary 
parts for the development of targeted technology or failure to be within tolerance of technology 
design specifications causing failure. 
6. Modeling: risk due to possible inadequacies of design modeling capability or inability of design 
modeling function to adequately address material issues. 
7. Simulation: risk due to variables not being accounted for in the simulation activity such as 
bench-scale or computer simulation or inadequacy of simulation activity to address existing field 
conditions, thus not being able to further identify risks. 
8. Field test and evaluation: risk due to failure to test and evaluate under actual field conditions that 
will be present during actual use of the technology or lack of fully understanding the results of a 
field test leading to erroneous tolerance limits being placed upon the technology. 
9. Operational: risk due to design issue resulting from failure to understand the operational 
requirement set. 
10. Environmental: risk due to issues resulting from technical process with unclear end-state that 
produces a waste stream or secondary waste generated that proves to be a handling issue for the 
end-user. 
11. Systems engineering/Quality Assurance: risk due to inadequate cascade of requirements and/or 
inadequate reviews being done at critical junctures in the life-cycle of program elements, individual 
projects, or failure to maintain records that are current in regard to regulatory requirements. 
E-3. EXTERNAL CATEGORIES 
1. Logistics/support: risk due to failure to adequately plan procurement officers necessary to support 
completion of procurements for bench-scale. 
2. Threat: risk due to criminal activity as in property destruction at a field test site. 
3. Market Threat: risk due to competition from other technology developers. 
4. Capability of the research and development performers: risk due to issues regarding available skills 
expertise, capabilities necessary to perform task at a laboratory, or inability of technology 
developer to attain necessary training to perform task. 
5. Stakeholders: risk due to failure to identify a stakeholder group causing issues with support for the 
program or project, or lack of understanding of requirements for technology from end-user or 
impacted stakeholder community. 
6. Requirements: risk due to not identifying requirements for the technology use in the field or risk of 
not fully understanding a requirement such as the need for material use that will be under a five 
pound limit. 
7. Operational: risk due to design issue resulting from failure to understand operation requirement that 
buttons for initiating technology process must be large enough to allow a gloved first responder to 
use technology in the field or lack of understanding the type of read-out necessary for immediate 
danger to be fully understood in the field. 
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8. Organizational: risk due to failure to foresee impact on program or project as a result of an 
organizational change in management at a laboratory or understanding full impact on the program 
or project when a reorganization change has occurred impacting availability of resources to the 
program or project. 
9. Political: risk due to not fully analyzing the impact on program if a change in party power occurs in 
Congress or failure to understand impact if change in appointees occur within Department of 
Energy if party in power changes. 
10. Systems such as health, safety, and environment: risk due to failure to understand the health, safety, 
and environment requirements imposed upon activities or tasks due to location of the technology 
test and evaluation or failure to fully understand the impact from safety, health, and environment 
requirements imposed within a facility where work is being performed. 
E-4. INTERNAL CATEGORIES 
1. Availability of resources: risk due to lack of necessary availability of required performers or budget 
due to failure to adequately determine and plan contingency funding. 
2. Management: risk due to inadequate champion within management for program. 
3. Stakeholders: risk due to failure of identification of an internal stakeholder group (end-user internal 
to the organization) causing issues with support for the program or project, or lack of 
understanding of requirements for technology from internal organization end-user community. 
4. Organizational: risk due to failure to foresee impact on program or project as a result of an 
organizational change in management at a laboratory, or understanding full impact on the program 
or project when a reorganization change has occurred impacting resources to the program or 
project. 
5. Systems such as health, safety, and environment: risk due to failure to understand the 
organizational internal health and safety requirements imposed upon activities or tasks due to 
location of the technology test and evaluation or failure to fully understand the impact from 
organizationally (beyond regulatory) imposed safety and health requirements imposed within a 
facility where work is being performed. 
